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Documentation and Emotions: Producing
Displaced Legal Subjects
SUSAN M. STERETT*
ABSTRACT

Disasters are globally inflected today in humanitarian assistance,
the organizationsthat support people after disaster and operate globally,
and in the mobilization of arguments international human rights
arguments. The domestic bureaucratic processes of humanitarian
assistance after disaster in the United States do not state these
connections; after Hurricane Katrina in the United States, they were
most evident in the people and organizationsthat helped, and in the flow
of humanitarian assistance from around the world that paid for
assistance. Second, domestic documents for claiming assistance must
limit that assistance to people hurt in disaster. That means they assist
people who claim to be away from home temporarily and displaced by
disaster. Therefore, the documents require that people claim to wish to go
home. However, when those who assisted believed return was unlikely,
documents also managed expectations about return by asking after
practical, material support for returning home, attempting to dampen
clients' longing for home. This article relies on interviews and
bureaucratic documents used after Katrina to explore global
subjectivitiesfor assistance,and the management of emotions.
INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC DISASTER ASSISTANCE
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United States, governments respond to disasters with assistance for the
disaster victims and pensions for those who respond to fires and floods.
Scholars rethinking the welfare state have found disaster assistance
foundational to national programs in the United States, a shift in focus
from long-standing analysis of programs such as social security for the
elderly and assistance to poor families.' In more recent times, the
international apparatus of humanitarianism has colored domestic
assistance, even though claiming human rights is not familiar to most
within the United States. 2 This Article examines the production of
paperwork and emotions in disaster assistance as a way of
understanding postneoliberal subjectivities. It does so through analysis
of housing assistance programs for persons displaced by Hurricane
Katrina since 2005.
Humanitarian assistance in the United States cares for the
choosing, planning person who is also a victim. That person is a subject
for global concern, as humanitarianism moralizes assistance from
governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the
world. 3 Humanitarian assistance integrates with global governance of
climate change in the face of rising sea levels. 4 In December 2015, press
coverage of the Paris climate change conference was accompanied by
stories of island nations where people would no longer be able to live
due to sea-level rise.5
Although Katrina was an exceptional event, catastrophes and
extreme weather events may be more frequent in the future. Extreme
events and sea-level rise in the United States may well require mass
migration away from the coasts. The National Climate Assessment
identifies "unplanned retreat" from the coasts as a key problem, given
expectations of sea-level rise and increasing numbers of extreme

1. See, e.g., MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2013); SUSAN M. STERETT, PUBLIC
PENSIONS: GENDER AND CIVIC SERVICE IN THE STATES, 1850-1937, at 4 (2003); Thomas A.

Krainz, Fleeing the Big Burn: Refugees, Informal Assistance, and Welfare Practices in the
ProgressiveEra, 24 J. POLY HIST. 405 (2012).
2. For the argument that the international humanitarian apparatus is a central part
of what brings law to disaster, see generally MARK FATHI MASSOUD, LAW'S FRAGILE STATE:
COLONIAL, AUTHORITARIAN, AND HUMANITARIAN LEGACIES IN SUDAN (2013).
3. See DIDIER FASIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE PRESENT 1-

2 (Rachel Gomme trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 2012) (2010).
4. See Coral Davenport, Pacific Island Nation Struggles in the Path of a Relentless
Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015, at Al.
5. See Paris Climate Change Conference - November 2015, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK

CONVENTION

ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE

(2015),

paris-nov_2015/meeting/8926.php (last visited March 10, 2016).

http://unfccc.int/meetings/
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weather events. 6 In the United States, there is no general framework for
relocation, though the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) recognizes that extreme events and rising sea levels will mean
displacement of already disadvantaged people. 7 Displaced people are the
legal subjects in the human rights framework for people who flee
extreme events, but migration due to climate change will require more
than temporary shelter on an emergency basis. Alternatively, the
neoliberal legal subject may be called on to manage her own disaster
relief.
In Part I, I situate disaster assistance in the United States in its
global context. In Part II, the Article discusses the production of legal
subjectivities through bureaucratic paperwork; this paperwork
mobilizes and brackets off emotional subjectivities. Part III then
discusses the sociolegal study of the production of emotions, linking it to
the narratives that law recognizes. In the United States, emotional
narratives of displacement include a readiness to move for opportunity
or mobility, contrasting with another American characteristic,
homesickness. Parts IV and V explain how those two tropes-mobility
and homesickness-organize the analysis of homelessness after Katrina
in accessing assistance. The Article intertwines the emotional states of
legal subjects and the paperwork that rationalizes, simplifies, avoids, or
produces those emotions. The Article draws on forms used to determine
eligibility for government assistance after Katrina. 8 It also draws on
interviews with displaced homeowners from the Gulf Coast. In these
interviews, I asked subjects about their understanding of home and
return. Contrasting those interpretations with the paperwork used to
claim assistance, and with caseworkers' guidance on how to fill out that
paperwork, illuminates how the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) understood displacement. The Article argues that
expecting return is not independent of law; legal work after disaster for
displaced people asks that people claim an intent to return home to
continue assistance.
6. Susanne C. Moser et al., Coastal Zone Development and Ecosystems, in CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 579,

591 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014). The National Climate Assessment is the United
States' leading reporting community on climate change and what it means for the United
States. It incorporates information from citizen comments, expert assessments, a Federal

Advisory Committee, and a panel of the National Academy of Sciences. See National
PROGRAM,
RESEARCH
CHANGE
GLOBAL
U.S.
Assessment,
Climate
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN 3 (Oct. 2014).
8. These administrative forms, filled out by displaced individuals seeking government
assistance, were collected during my own fieldwork.
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GLOBALIZATION, DISPLACEMENT, AND ASSISTANCE

Neoliberalism's hallmark is its reliance on the market and
individual responsibility. Individual disaster relief partly suspends a
commitment to individual responsibility by treating people as subjects
in desperate need who merit help. Disaster relief programs claim to
enact respect for humanitarian needs. However, individual disaster
assistance is to help people through a time-limited disaster, and
everyone who helps sees creating the self-sufficient liberal legal subject
who is individually responsible for choosing where and how to live as
crucial to providing determinable assistance. This tension is evident in
bureaucratic forms structuring the distribution of assistance. This
Article therefore argues that state processes guide choices and produce
subjectivities through the forms that are the hallmark of disaster
governance.
States mediate globalization by producing the global through
domestic political processes, as Carol Greenhouse has argued. 9 Yet,
Greenhouse continues, we have not traced domestic processes and the
production of the global in domestic political subjectivities.10 In disaster
assistance, domestic bureaucratic processes tacitly inscribe the global
legal subject of humanitarian assistance. Below I describe three ways
that global governance provides a backdrop to domestic assistance, both
by its presence and by its absence. First, at the time of Katrina, public
commentary framed a reference to international status as offensive.
International guidelines for displaced people largely went unmentioned,
though a local organization did mobilize the guidelines to frame its
critique of the government. Second, the United States government
sometimes uses disasters in other countries to extend temporary legal
status to those countries' nationals already living in the United States.
Finally, disasters attract international donations for domestic use. In
the United States, Katrina brought $66 million in international
donations.
Commentators first called displaced people "refugees," linking those
who were displaced with international refugees." To displaced
Americans, however, refugee status implied abject status, not the
9. See Carol J. Greenhouse, Introduction, in ETHNOGRAPHIES OF NEOLIBERALISM 1
(Carol J. Greenhouse ed., 2010);
see also SALLY ENGLE MERRY, Introduction: Culture and Transnationalism,in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 1
(2006).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Lynn Weber & Lori Peek, Documenting Diaspora:An Introduction, in
LIFE IN THE KATRINA DIASPORA (Lynn Weber & Lori Peek eds., 2012); Dana Hull, What's
in a Name?, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REVIEW, http://ajrarchive.orgArticle.asp?id=3963.
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international rights so unfamiliar in the United States.12 "Refugee"
implied that they were claiming assistance beyond their ordinary rights
of national belonging.1 3 National belonging and citizenship meant more
to displaced people than international human rights. The more
appropriate guidelines are the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement.14 People who are "internally displaced" have not
crossed national boundaries, though they have had to leave home,
because of war or other disaster. Issued in 1998, the Guiding Principles
provide for an amalgam of basic civil rights and liberties for internally
displaced persons, such as freedom of thought, a right to vote, a right
15
against discrimination, and a right to protection in war and disaster.
States are urged to protect those within their borders from
displacement, unless displacement is required for the safety and health
of those displaced; to gain the informed consent of the displaced; and to
16
The
provide a right to judicial review of displacement decisions.
choose
to
right
the
given
be
people
that
recommend
Guiding Principles
where they will reside temporarily. 17 (Displacement is not permanent,
unlike migration.) 18
Few in the United States invoked the Guiding Principles at the time
of Katrina, even to mobilize political claims. Applying international
guidelines to internal events in the United States plays better at the
level of professional elites than in the affected communities themselves.
Advocacy groups brought up the Guiding Principles, and the project on
Internal Displaced People at the Brookings Institution addressed them
in a panel on natural disasters and displacement in January 2008.19
12. On resistance to human rights claims and the United States, see, for example,
Sally Engle Merry & Jessica Shimmin, The Curious Resistance to Seeing Domestic
Violence as a Human Rights Violation in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 113 (Shareen Hertel & Kathryn Libal eds.,
2011).
13. See, e.g., Susan M. Sterett, Need and CitizenshipAfter Disaster, 13 NAT'L HAZARDS
REV. 233 (2012); WHEN THE LEVEES BROKE: A REQUIEM IN FOUR ACTS (HBO Documentary

Films & 40 Acres and a Mule Filmworks 2006).
14. See U.N. Rep. of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement,U.N. Doc. E/CN.411998/53IAdd.2 (1998) (by Francis M. Deng).
15. Id.
16. Id. at art. 1, 6, 7, 14.
17. Id.
18. See Walter Kiihn, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations, 38
ASIL STUD. TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 3-6 (2008).
19. See Ajamu Baraka et al., Discussion at The Brookings Institution: Fires, Floods,
Earthquakes and Tsunamis: A Human Rights Perspective for Major Natural Disasters
(Jan. 14, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/
2008/l/14-disasters/20080114_disasters.pdf); see also Chris Kromm & Sue Sturgis,
HurricaneKatrinaand the Guiding Principleson Internal Displacement:A Global Human
Rights Perspective on a Natural Disaster, XXXVI INST. FOR S. STUD. (Jan. 2008). The
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While the Guiding Principles had not been considered in the context of
natural disasters, the international human rights dimensions of
national security had been in the news in a different context when
Katrina struck. Media expos6s of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq and its legitimation by legal officials had been widely
reported, and in September, U.S. Army Private Lynndie England was
convicted of torture. 20 The language of human rights had become more
available in the United States.
The Guiding Principles imagine a liberal legal subject: individuals
choose, and they autonomously consider what is best for them. As Sally
Engle Merry has argued with regard to the legal subject of international
law, the state is to set the conditions for life and individuals are to
assert rights. 21 For the legal subject embedded in the Guiding
Principles, the choices people make represent what they want to do
independent of the law. Choices act on preferences formed before legal
guidelines come into play. Creation of a choosing subject threads its way
through the Guiding Principles to the bureaucratic checklists and the
production of paper and electronic forms that zoomed through the
Internet in organizing assistance. While the subject of the Guiding
Principles is a subject of concern and care who must be protected from
violence, the subject must also be able to choose where to live and
whether to return. The subject should also have access to judicial
review. By the time international concerns make it to domestic
bureaucratic forms, the person who is assisted must also make plans to
leave assistance. Individual plans and plans for family-more than the
responsibility of states to protect-characterize the assistance.
Next, global governance and domestic policy shape domestic legal
subjectivity for those who are living away from their home country in a
way that illuminates the problems of documentation for those who have
been internally displaced. When there is a disaster in a home country,
undocumented people in the United States may gain legal recognition
via the category "temporary protected status," extended by the

hurricane happened in August 2005, and international law as relevant to the United
States had most recently been in the news regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
late 2003 through early 2004, extensive coverage of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison
generated public discussion of the Geneva Convention. See, e.g., JINEE LOKANEETA, "Being

Helplessly Civilized Leaves Us at the Mercy of the Beast": Post-9/11 Discourses on Torture
in the United States, in TRANSNATIONAL TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE, AND STATE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (2011).
20. See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE WAR
ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008).
21. See MERRY, supranote 9, at 5.
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government wholly as a matter of discretion. Change of status has
practical implications. When undocumented people physically reside in
the United States, they gain temporary protected status after a disaster
in their home country, and documenting one's presence becomes
important. When one is undocumented with no hope of legal status, one
is physically present and legally absent. Keeping one's self legally
invisible while also accumulating the papers needed to work is a trick
23
Once the
that makes the law untrustworthy and confusing.
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24
in sociolegal studies of immigration, most notably by Susan Coutin. It
is relevant every time the national state offers legal status, including
after a home-country disaster. Rapid reversal in the need to document
also illuminates the legal status of some of the poorest of internally
displaced people after Katrina, who went from living in family homes to
which they could not document a claim, to having to document residence
in areas affected by the hurricanes in order to claim assistance.
Finally, disasters attract international donations and NGOs that
work with refugees. After Katrina, international donations paid for
casework, established through a nonprofit comprising organizations
that ordinarily provided assistance to refugees resettling in the United
States. 25 When it had funds to distribute, the U.S. government had to
rely on organizations already in place. Caseworkers assigned to help
people access assistance and resettle were employees of nonprofits that
worked with volunteers to resettle refugees. Posters in offices were of
people from distant lands, not from the Gulf Coast or the cities in which
people found themselves after fleeing the hurricane. Therefore,
narratives of legal obligations to refugees structured aid even where no
one mentioned international law.
When disaster displaces people, they are dispossessed; this
dispossession is a global phenomenon. The extent of the dispossession
varies from losing belongings accumulated over a lifetime and friends
and family who live in streets one knows well, to losing a temporary

22. See generally Alka Sapat & Ann-Margaret Esnard, TransboundaryImpacts of the
2010 Haiti Earthquake Disaster: Focus on Legal Dilemmas in South Florida, 3 ONATI
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 254, 262-63 (2013).
23. See, e.g., SUSAN COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOvES 68-69 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Susan Coutm, Comment: The Violence of Being Not Quite There, 7 L.,
CULTURE & HUMAN. 457 (2011).
25. See STERETT, supra notel.
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place to stay in which one recently landed. Although dispossession can
open up the possibility of collective action, 26 the individualized
bureaucratic processes by which people claim assistance, sometimes far
from the place that justifies their claims and far from the people they
know, makes it impossible to imagine making collective claims.

II. PAPERWORK AND PRODUCING LEGAL SUBJECTS
In the United States, governing and law happen in the forms that
people fill out with street-level officials, or front-line state workers. 27
This Article examines the subjectivities state forms imply. Legal
settlements, political negotiations, and statutes inform the narratives
structured by forms. 28 The Article uses as a case study the process of
claiming housing assistance by displaced people after Hurricane
Katrina. The process of claiming assistance enacted a familiar U.S.
bureaucratic process of claiming, though it was put in place especially
for Katrina. The subjectivities produced by the officials' paperwork were
ones of practical, material resources that were or were not available,
bracketing off the personal losses people may have felt.
For example, a nonprofit asked applicants for housing assistance to
think about what was available in New Orleans if they were planning to
return.29 It warned everyone that utilities were not available, health
care was limited, and costs had risen. Nonprofits used a checklist from
an NGO in New Orleans that focused people on material resources that
were unavailable. It asked about whether people had seen the home
they wanted to return to, and whether they understood the extent of the
damage. A form from FEMA required for applying for individual
housing assistance, the "Request for Continued Direct Rental Payment
Checklist," asked people to state their plan to obtain affordable
housing. 30 Caseworkers got their understanding of how to fill out that
section from FEMA officials, and caseworkers in turn explained to
displaced people how to write a narrative about home: applicants had to
explain that they had a plan to do something ("hire a contractor, find a
new place to live") that they had not yet done. If they wanted to receive
26. See JUDITH BUTLER & ATHENA ATHANASIOU, DISPOSSESSION: THE PERFORMATIVE
IN THE POLITICAL 2 (2013) ('[Dlisposession implies imposed injuries, ...
that call to be
addressed and redressed.").
27. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).

28. Cf. Barbara J. Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's
Compensation and Mothers'Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123, 142-45 (Linda
Gordon, ed., 1990) (discussing the Mothers' Aid application and case investigation forms).
29. Samples of these collected forms are on file with the author.
30. Form on file with the author.
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assistance, they could not say that they had done everything they could,
nor that they had settled where they were. Planning to do something to
make it possible to return to New Orleans meant that one had not fully
settled where one was staying, so rental assistance could still be
available.
The form from the nonprofit and the form from FEMA each asked
people to consider information about the practicalities of where they
wanted to live. From the nonprofit's point of view, people needed to
know the material limits to housing and infrastructure in the Gulf
Coast. From FEMA's point of view, people needed to plan to take action
to resettle. They also needed to make a plan regarding employment,
parenting, and income, assessing where they were and where they
31
needed to be, and what barriers they found. If people had their
information structured for them, they could plan and make the right
choice .32
Planning and information provisions are also central to governing
the liberal legal subject. To inform or to structure choices is to do so for
a reason: that without the structure, the choice would be wrong. Patrick
Roberts has argued that after the Fukushima disaster, agencies
competed to demonstrate their competency by getting out information
33
about the expected international diffusion of radiation. Agencies with
very little authority to command demonstrate their competence by
sharing information. Organizations, countries, scholars, and citizens
could decide what to do with that information. Kim Fortun has argued
that a central strategy for environmental governance in recent years
has been increasingly sophisticated sharing of information via
websites. 34 She argues that official knowledge of the damage caused by

31. See, e.g., Self Sufficiency Plan: Assessment (form on file with author).
32. Informing choice is part of another regulatory strategy that is a matter of concern
in this collection: nudging, or setting up choices so that the default is one that
policymakers have determined is best for people. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:

IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS

(2008). One justification is precisely that choosing is cognitively overwhelming and the
poorest citizens, who are less capable of choice, often have the most to choose. See
generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF
CHOICE (2015).

33. See Patrick S. Roberts, Legitimacy in Global Disaster Response: Comparing
CTBTO and IAEA Responses to Fukushima (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (showcasing the ability of a relatively new, smaller international organization to
demonstrate how original routines can solve a novel problem).
34. See Kim Fortun, Environmental Right-to-Know and the Transmutationsof Law, in
CATASTROPHE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE HUMANITARIAN IMPULSE 146, 152-54 (Austin

Sarat & Javier Lezaun eds., 2009).
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the BP oil spill in 2010, 35 for example, or the 2014 explosion in a Texas
fertilizer factory,3 6 is of doubtful quality and controlled by the
companies responsible for the disaster. The overlay of maps and
publication of toxicity information by advocacy groups has the potential
of making knowledge more plural. It has no authority to command and
requires that people decide what to do. 37
Informing choice has also been a regulatory response after the
financial crisis in the United States. The new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau takes a consumer information approach to banking
regulation. Consumers are informed about fraud, and the regulatory
project is to simplify that information so that consumers can actually
use it. Websites demonstrate their beautiful, useable interactive
graphics that provide neighborhood-level information about toxic
hazards, schools, real estate, fraud schemes, and radiation threats. In
contrast, forms used to apply for assistance were simple, even if figuring
out a housing plan or stating family goals were not.
Liberal legal subjects are informed, thoughtful, not caught in habits
that are difficult to change, and able to make rational decisions.
Rationality drops out the very emotional calculations that are crucial to
decisions. As Tal Kastner argues, synthesizing psychological and
behavioral economic research, people seldom are the subjects law
imagines them to be: we all become cognitively overwhelmed, and we
have emotional attachments bureaucratic rationality does not account
for. However, we will produce the stories that the law requires of us to
gain its benefits, and legal guides such as caseworkers can tell us what
the right stories are. Bureaucracies do not recognize loss and longing
well. 38 In this context, bureaucratic rationality meant bracketing off loss
of the places, friends, families, and beliefs that one had before the
storm. People may well want things not encompassed by the forms
designed to guide their decisions.
The paperwork for accessing assistance and guiding decisionmaking is the "actant" that contributed to a particular subjectivity: the
choosing neoliberal legal subject in disaster. 39 In Bruno Latour and
35. WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG AND R. GRAMLING, BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP OIL
SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN AMERICA (2012).

36. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Lax Oversight Cited as Factorin Deadly Blast at Texas
Plant, New York Times (April 22, 2014), http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/us/lack-ofoversight-and-regulations-blamed-in-texas-chemical-explosion.html?_r-0.
37. See Self-Sufficiency Plan, supra note 31, at 163-65.
38. Queer theory articulates a politics of loss, as Chantal Nadeau's contribution to this
collection demonstrates. See Chantal Nadeau, Courage, Post-Immunity Politics, and the
Regulation of the Queer Subject, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 505-529 (2016).
39. BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING
NETWORK THEORY 54-55 (2005).
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Peter Weibel's book Making Things Public: Atmosphere of Democracy,
Philippe Geslin and Ellen Hertz similarly find paperwork to be a force
that organizes claims. They ask how indigenous people are produced in
international law. They answer:
[P]aper, or more precisely, documents . . . .Without
armies of soulless bureaucrats shuffling dossiers, no
collective soul to move history forward; without the letter
of the law of international human rights, no spirit
against which to measure it. International norms come
to life within institutions, and these institutions are
peopled with human beings. But40human beings alone ...
go nowhere without documents.
In the case of disaster assistance after Katrina, those documents
allow us to focus on a bureaucratic process within humanitarian
assistance in disaster. Susan Silbey and Ayn Cavicchi argue that
material objects are partially constituted by legal rules that then
41
become invisible in the final object. They point out all the legal rules
made manifest in automobiles: the seat belts, the air bags, the mirrors
42
that fold in, the gas mileage. Seat belts and air bags protect people by
making some unsafe choices-not wearing a seat belt-harder to make.
They form a particular kind of subject. In contrast, forms after the
Katrina disaster manifested a legal subject who had to choose and may
have longed for home.
Documents are "constituents of social relations"; they "preserve a
43
The
definite form of words detached from their local historicity.
documents that governments produce recognize new statuses; through
them one can come to be recognized as a person with disabilities, as a
44
citizen, or as a legal resident. Claiming a status can be empowering
but also debilitating if one is asking the state to recognize victimization
and loss. In a late bureaucratic state, documents from administrative
agencies constitute our legal encounters. Documents construct our
40. Philippe Geslin & Ellen Hertz, Public InternationalIndigenes, in MAKING THINGS
PUBLIC: ATMOSPHERES OF DEMOCRACY 566, 571 (Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel eds., 2005).
41. Susan Silbey & Ayn Cavicchi, The Common Place of Law: TransformingMatters of
Concern into the Objects of Everyday Life, in MAKING THINGS PUBLIC: ATMOSPHERES OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 40, at 556.

42. See id. at 558-59.
43. DOROTHY E. SMITH, TEXTS, FACTS, AND FEMININITY: EXPLORING THE RELATIONS OF

RULING 210 (1990).
44. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); Barbara Yngvesson & Susan Bibler Coutin, Backed
by Papers: Undoing Persons, Histories,and Return, 33 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 177 (2006).
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experience of the state. 45 The files and the people managing them,
sometimes including NGOs, make up the state. 46 Legal categories
produce narratives and imply emotional states. Categories and forms
bracket off particular stories as legally irrelevant to the bureaucratic
rationality state agencies aim to produce. Documents bring the aura of
bureaucratic rationality and practicality to joy in family formation: for
example, the birth certificates and marriage certificates that confirm
family status in adoption 47 and marriages. 48 Those documents also
exclude some emotions or particular histories as irrelevant to law. 49
For example, the documents that recognized displacement were not
tied to the meaning of place. Assistance after Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita were for particular disasters. The national commentary on what
people had lost focused on the distinctive history of the Gulf Coast,
including people's ties through jobs, family, and history to a place. 50 In
interviews, people would tell stories of family, music, fishing, and
restaurant work; or of mental health, violence, and crime. In contrast,
displacement documents asked about the generalizable infrastructure of
anyplace: schools, hospitals, housing, electricity, and water.
I now examine the structure of emotional states and what counts as
rational decision-making through legal documentation of claims for
housing assistance after disaster. I focus on two emotional states: fear
and anxiety, and the desire to return. The register of fear or anxiety
after disaster may be reminiscent of the fear and anxiety produced in
policing, but in the context of humanitarian assistance rather than
punishment. Even so, the surveillance required to recertify the need for

45. As do the narratives of front line officials, including teachers, police, and employees
of agencies like the Department of Motor Vehicles. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (discussing how

individuals experience bureaucracy, the policy behind the human interactions, and
methods of interacting).
46. Annelise Riles, Introduction: In Response, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN
KNOWLEDGE 1, 5 (Annelise Riles ed., 2006) (citing David Dery, "Papereality"and Learning
in BureaucraticOrganizations,29 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 677 (1998)).
47. See Susan M. Sterett, Parents and Paperwork: Same-Sex Parents, Birth
Certificates, and Emergent Legality, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS
CONFRONT THE LAW 103 (Scott Barclay et al. eds., 2009).
48. See, e.g., JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, The Status of Status, in THE LIMITS TO
UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 77 (2002). See generally
KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW

(2006) (profiling the insights and experiences of same-sex couples that look to the law to
legitimate their relationship amidst the shifting legal, political, and cultural climate).
49. See generally Hilary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by
ManagingFeelings in Contractsfor SurrogateLabor, 49 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 143 (2015).
50. See, e.g., Hurricaneon the Bayou (Audubon Nature Institute 2007); Henry Jenkins,
People from that Part of the World, 21 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 17 (2006).
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assistance could produce fear and anxiety. The other expectation both
produced and excluded in the form asking to document the need for
assistance was that people would want to return. The process of
assistance itself could shape the decision to return for people who
accessed housing assistance, and forms from both FEMA and the
charitable organizations that provided casework provide insight into
how that process could have worked.
stories of dispossession legible to
Documentation makes
create the status they document. The
papers
doing,
so
In
bureaucracy.
relationships-for example, leaving
our
simplify
use
people
forms that
other place. The air of neutral legalsome
for
formation
family
in
the joy
can structure the legal person.
also
forms
in
recognition
bureaucratic
For example, the struggle for recognition of same-sex family
relationships in the United States has 51included struggles to get
recognized as a parent on a birth certificate.
Part III outlines the ways we have recognized the mobilization of
emotion in law. Analysis of mobilizing emotion in law has productively
illuminated fear and crime; we can turn to other stories of law as a way
of understanding how the administrative state works. In turn, that
framework will be useful in organizing the expected responses to
displacement in American culture: the hope of moving for opportunity
and, alternatively, homesickness.
III.

EMOTIONAL STATES AND NARRATIVES IN LAW

In the United States, the war on terror and the public policy of
crime control have brought to life how law governs through emotions.
Communities are frightened of authorities, and the fear and anxiety
that governing through suspicion and terror evokes are itself part of
state control. Fear of authorities disrupts families, as people stay away
from kin who could be in trouble with the law, or those in trouble stay
away from family members whom they do not want to be threatened.
Fear also governs communities under threat: in the United States, local
news magnifies fear of street crime and alerts mobilize fear of terrorist
attacks. Using the law to mobilize and manage fear is a strategy of
governing that has come under increasing focus in both crime and
52
occupation.
51. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the right to marry is
fundamental and inherent to the liberty of the person and, under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and liberty). See also Sterett, supra note 47.
52. See Silvia Pasquetti, Legal Emotions: An Ethnography of Distrust and Fear in the
Arab Districtsof an Israeli City, 47 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461, 461-65 (2013).
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Governing through fear, and then assuring people that governments
can manage the threat that gives rise to the fear, was also at the heart
of documenting plans during the Cold War.53 Government reports that
laid out plans for managing catastrophes unlike anything anyone had
ever seen were "fantasy documents." 54 They treated plans for dealing
with the unimaginable, including nuclear catastrophe, as rational and
reasonable.5 5 The fear and terror were never named; those who wrote
the documents laying out the plans framed the plans as pragmatic. 5 6
These analyses of fear point to other areas in which governing officials
manage emotion, areas less commonly recognized. The maw of war and
crime loom so large that they threaten to encompass every other realm
of legal mobilization, documentation, and emotion. Analyses of
displacement depended on tropes that organize American culture
concerning home: the expectation that people were homesick, or longed
to go home and therefore constituted a diaspora that had lost a selfcontained community, as against the expectation that people are mobile
and always ready to move.
Because stories are told for a particular purpose, stories from the
disaster that imply compensation are intertwined with what legal
categories will recognize as loss. Law mobilizes stories that it will
recognize. For example, in the United States, the most legendary book
on legal harm, disaster, and trauma focused on the Buffalo Creek
disaster, a flood that destroyed an entire community in 1972 when a
pond holding the waste from coal mining failed and the water ripped
down the valley.5 7 A law firm lavished effort on the case, including
hiring sociologist Kai Erikson, an expert on catastrophe, to produce an
account of what the loss of community meant to the people in Buffalo
Creek. He did so by reading thousands of pages of depositions by people
who had lost their homes.58 The loss of community was central to the
claim that the plaintiffs made. Depositions were produced to document
the legal claim for emotional loss beyond the material loss of houses,
schools, medical care, stores, and roads, a claim for losses much larger
than the loss of poor people's buildings. The stories of the losses were
produced for the lawyers and legal claims. The stories produced to make
legal claims for compensation then justified the claims by commentators
53. See, e.g., LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME
DISASTER 82-90 (1999).

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE STORY OF THE SURVIVORS'

UNPRECEDENTED LAWSUIT (1976) (retelling how the survivors sued the coal mining
company for corporate irresponsibility).
58. See generally id.
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and policymakers that people had lost their communities, not just their
homes. 59 We see the claim that a loss of community is the deepest loss
when we call people who have fled a "diaspora." That claim cannot be
60
extricated from the law that produced compensation for loss of a home.
Part IV turns to displacement after Katrina. It describes who
counted as displaced, the broader context of homelessness in which the
disaster happened, and then individual narratives of displacement.

IV.

HOMELESSNESS, DISPLACEMENT, AND DISASTER

A. Counting DisplacedPeople
Public commentary often ties disaster to a place; we see the
devastation of Katrina to New Orleans, even ten years later. The pop
star Beyonc6's 2016 video "Formation" recalls Katrina in New Orleans;
she sits on a police car that slowly sinks into floodwater in New
Orleans. 61 However, many people fled the Gulf Coast and stayed far
away, even away from the states that hosted most of the evacuees:
Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia. If we center our concern on the people
rather than the place, we will be looking to people who are not within
the areas most often depicted. It is difficult to know how many people
were far away; FEMA counts households, not people, since FEMA
distributes assistance by household. John Logan, a demographer, used
multiple sources of data to estimate how many people were away after
Katrina, and how far away, by relying on postal change of address
filings and population estimates from a survey done in December 2005.
Logan argues that people who had lived in New Orleans and had not
returned were more likely to be poor and black. By December 2005, 46
percent of those over eighteen who had fled were in states other than
Louisiana, while 11 percent of white people who were over eighteen and
had fled were in states other than Louisiana. 62 As of March 2006, six
months after Katrina, 57,200 households had addresses away from
Louisiana, Texas, and Atlanta, Georgia, according to applications to

59. See KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE
BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD 194 (1976).

60. See Willis Hon, 5th Circuit Reverses Itself on HurricaneKatrinaLiability Lawsuit,
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 14, 18 (2013).
61. For a discussion and critique, see Shantrelle Lewis, '7Formation" Exploits New
http://www.slate.com/articles/double x/doublex/2016/O2lbeyonc-s_
Trauma,
Orleans'
formationexploits new orleans_trauma.html.
62. JOHN R. LOGAN, POPULATION DISPLACEMENT AND POST-KATRINA POLITICS: THE
NEW ORLEANS MAYORAL RACE, 2006, at 8 (rev. ed.. 2006), available at http://www.s4.
brown.edu/katrina/report2.pdf.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

23:2

FEMA for individual assistance due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 6 3
The poorest areas had flooded badly. Of the African American people
who were displaced,

61.7 percent

had incomes

under $20,000.64

Homeowners could not get their homes repaired; schooling, medical
care, and utilities were not in place; renters faced higher rents; and
public housing was not reopening. More of the poorest people left and
stayed away. Arguments about the obligation to rebuild New Orleans
recur, but neighborhoods with little housing and infrastructure have not
brought people back.
B. HousingAssistance
The cash housing assistance for people displaced after Katrina

worked as follows. 65 First, people received emergency

assistance.

Sometimes the federal government paid for people to be housed in
hotels, other times in apartments or houses. FEMA then transitioned
people who had not been able to find and pay for permanent housing to
individual assistance. Emergency assistance ended in early 2006 for
most people, and they transitioned to individual assistance that the
Stafford Act at the time capped at $26,200.66 That had to cover the
replacement of everything one had lost that was not covered by
insurance, as well as rent.
Those on individual assistance had to recertify their need for rent
assistance every three months and provide rent receipts, though FEMA
could choose to ask for recertification more frequently. In order to get
assistance, an applicant's home had to be unavailable, and they had to
be unable to make stable, permanent arrangements wherever they were
staying. People had to explain their long-term plans. Those plans could
be to find work and get settled where they were, or to return to New
Orleans once they could find housing there.
Assistance after Katrina was part of the policies governing
homelessness that had become visible in the United States from the
1990s onward. Assistance after Katrina included payment to hotels or
private landlords for rent. Local governments wanted to extend the
assistance, as it kept people housed who might otherwise lack shelter
and join the homeless people already managed within cities. Housing
63. Id.
64. Id. at 9.
65. For a more detailed overview, see Susan M. Sterett, Disaster,Displacement, and
Casework: Uncertainty and Assistance After HurricaneKatrina,37 LAW & POL'Y 61, 71-76
(2015).
66. See Dollar Limits of Disaster Assistance?, FEMAINFO,
available at
http://www.femainfo.us/Disaster_Assistance OverviewStep_3.shtml.
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groups allied with local governments (who could see themselves
becoming responsible for many more homeless people once the federal
government stopped paying assistance), filed lawsuits, and otherwise
made claims for extended assistance, and the National Low Income
Housing Coalition, not primarily a disaster-relief organization,
participated in pressing for new programs.
To isolate disaster assistance as a particular program mistakes it as
the only assistance people need when it is one element within the ad hoc
social welfare state that operates in a context of growing inequality,
insufficient access to housing,6 7 and suspicion of those in need. If we
take citizens rather than FEMA as the center of concern, we can see
that assistance takes multiple forms: people can find the generally
available disability assistance they had before the disaster, or the
68
available housing via Section 8 assistance, or donated furniture, or
help from family members to be central. Local government officials saw
that people displaced after the disaster would become their
responsibility once federal assistance ended, though they would have no
new resources to help. Conversely, advocates for homeless people could
see the new postdisaster benefits as an opportunity. We have long
69
known that disaster politics and policy are not contained by the event.
Their context is one of other policies and politics, already organized
groups, and frameworks of rights and responsibilities that extend to the
disaster. 70 The disaster leaks through the event. For example, after
Katrina, housing assistance included renting houses that the mortgage
corporation Fannie Mae held from the foreclosures that had been
spreading through the country, charging only a minimal price.
Political bargains about accountability for government payments
shaped the continuing need for recertification. If FEMA paid for housing
for people who had not needed it, or for people who were homeless for
other reasons, and later investigation documented the misallocation of
funds, FEMA would continue to look bad for wasting money. They could
try to collect the money, but they probably would not succeed. The
67. See, e.g., MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN
CITY (2016).

68. See id. (explaining housing assistance).
69. See generally Uriel Rosenthal, Future Disasters,Future Definitions, in WHAT IS A
DISASTER? PERSPECTIVES ON THE QUESTION 146 (E. L. Quarantelli ed., 1998) (focusing on
the interplay between empirical developments and the conceptualization of disasters in
discussing the "disaster after the disaster").
70. See DAUBER, supra note 1, at 1-16 (detailing the legal and political frameworks of
the welfare state during the New Deal and disaster relief post-Katrina); seealso KIM
FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS

(2001) (discussing how disasters such as Bhopal are thrust into systems already created,
which then must attempt to work through the disaster).
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solution was to recertify people every three months rather than expect
to collect money that had been wrongly claimed. That made claiming
the money repeatedly uncertain. In learning how to fill out the forms,
people had to remain unsettled; the emotions that were central to the
experience of being displaced were bracketed out of the forms and left to
mental health workers, yet embedded in the requirement that one
remain unsettled to get assistance.
C. Talking to Displaced People: Homeownership and Dispossession
The rest of this Article draws on interviews with thirteen people
who fled family homes after the 2005 hurricanes. Interviews with people
who had family-owned homes in New Orleans draw from a broader
project, which included interviews with ninety people displaced to
Colorado, far from New Orleans, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We
also relied on interviews and attendance at meetings that brought
together volunteers, paid emergency managers, caseworkers, and
representatives from charitable organizations. Some people had arrived
via government planes, unaware where they were flying until they
figured it out from the long flight-time, or because the pilot announced
it shortly before landing. Others came on their own, whether because
they had family, friends, or experience living there, or because they had
heard it was less overwhelmed than Houston and could provide good
support. The modal age range was from fifty to fifty-nine, with people as
old as seventy being displaced to Denver.
Since the focus of the Article is on home and mobility, it draws from
interviews with people who fled family homes because they had the
clearest reason to be tied to the Gulf Coast. Family homes were those
that had long been held in the family, so they did not have a mortgage.
Ten homeowners were African American and most had been living in
homes that had long been in their families. Two had mortgages. For
some, relatives shared ownership, with shares ambiguous. The line
between home ownership and homelessness could be fine. For example,
we included a man who lived with his mother; in turn, his mother had
inherited the home from her mother. We chose to have an inclusive
definition of ownership. Among the homeowners we had talked to, only
three had arrived by government plane. The rest had come to Denver
some other way, sometimes because family had helped. Eleven of the
thirteen had lived in New Orleans most of their lives, though some of
them had also lived elsewhere, including in Denver. Seven of the
thirteen had friends or family in Colorado. Two of those who came by
government plane did not have friends or family nearby. The
government transported them without planning and with no help that
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would make moving easier. Homeowners were between thirty-six and
sixty-eight years old, with a mean of fifty and a standard deviation of
nine and three quarters. One African American woman from New
Orleans had spent many years away, including in the city to which she
fled. She and one white man had mortgages.
People had access to housing assistance from FEMA. Their legal
engagements were through bureaucratic forms. Legal engagements
were multilevel, though the levels were not visible to each citizen
applying for help. Individuals encountered FEMA officials, caseworkers,
and questions about documentation and forms. At another level, the
how FEMA
federal courts were also deciding cases challenging
71
people.
displaced
for
assistance
housing
administered
Mobilizing the law within bureaucratic agencies requires
simplifying a messy knot of problems into categories legible to
bureaucratic agencies and what they can provide. For example, one
interviewee, James, had lived with his mother in her home. He had long
struggled with substance abuse, and he had stopped living with his
girlfriend because they were never able to help each other in recovery.
After the hurricane, he talked about missing his girlfriend. His mother
lived somewhere else, and their home had been destroyed. He wanted to
be with his girlfriend, who was in New Orleans. He could not figure out
what he could do about his girlfriend and his mother, and he wanted to
be with them. That problem was at the top of his mind, and the ties
between people help everyone recover from disaster, and asking people
to rely on friends on family fits well with the disaster recovery
community's belief that government can only help at the margins. Yet
James's problems did not fit well with what assistance could support.
Volunteer organizations did not want to encourage to return those who
missed family, as James did, but who could not have the housing,
electricity, plumbing, health care, and schools that would have made it
possible to go back to New Orleans.
Caseworkers in cities to which people were displaced learned from
those in New Orleans that moving back was not a good idea.
Caseworkers discussed their worry that people were thinking about the
family and friends they missed, and that they did not have a realistic
assessment of conditions in New Orleans. No one knew what
information people had from the news or from friends and family.
Therefore, nonprofits circulated a form that caseworkers in other cities
used. It asked people to decide about returning based on particular
plans about, for example, the health care that was available, the
71. See, e.g., Ridgely v. FEMA, 512 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2008); Watson v. FEMA, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 29382 (5th Cir. 2006); McWaters v. FEMA, 237 F.R.D. 155 (E.D. La.
2006).
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schools, and the childcare. Each question had a checkbox. The document
allowed the caseworkers not to treat their worries about people's
decisions as something personal. The form could absorb anxiety or
disagreement, or the personal stories that animated people. The form
also treated needs as universal rather than particular. 72 The checklist
people worked on with a caseworker reminded them to think
realistically about return, and realism bracketed off the people one
might miss.
The form is central to understanding the subjectivity performed
around the legal housing-assistance practices. The form allowed
caseworkers to treat people as planners and choosers, not as people the
caseworkers were telling what to do. It asked people to get their own
information about what was available and decide themselves whether
moving to New Orleans was a sensible thing to do. What was sensible
included not what people might have missed, whether a girlfriend,
parent, or neighborhood. It was hospitals and schools, certainly
necessary for living but not at all what people mean by home.
James's encounter with the law of displacement and assistance
mischaracterized how James and others who fled after the storm
understood what they needed and what they lost. First, law provided for
those who were displaced. Having had a home that was no longer
available was a requirement for getting help, and help was only
temporary. FEMA provided housing assistance until one got resettled,
or until one had reached the statutory cap on assistance. FEMA stopped
assistance when someone was unable to prove that their home was
uninhabitable or that they were spending their assistance money on
rent. In other words, gaining assistance was uncertain. Loss was central
to the legal subjectivity constructed and so was planning to get over
loss. People were to be both tied to a place, one they would long for, and
yet ready to move. Second, the loss recognized was temporary and
material. Long-term needs and the need for family and friends were
irrelevant to claiming housing assistance: James needed shelter after
the storm. 73 The applications for individual assistance, for housing
72. For the point that disaster reduces people to the event, erasing particular histories,
see generally DIDIER FASSIN & RICHARD RECHTMAN, THE EMPIRE OF TRAUMA: AN INQUIRY

INTO THE CONDITION OF VICTIMHOOD (Rachel Gomme trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2009)
(2007).
73. The state also provided mental health assistance. See Andrew J. F. Morris, Psychic
Aftershocks: Crisis Counseling and Disaster Relief Policy, 14 HIST. PSYCHOL. 264, 264-65
(2011). The assistance was temporary and had been provided on the enduring, yet
unproven, assumption that disaster created mental health problems. Id. at 265. For many
after Katrina, the assistance itself created some problems. Mental health providers
struggled with the mental health needs created by both the uncertainty and the assistance
itself, as well as those of individuals who had mental health problems prior to the
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vouchers, for Fannie-Mae-financed houses, or public housing were
applications for shelter. Rent would be paid, or a foreclosed home would
be available for a low payment. The shelter would be where shelter was,
not where families or friends were. Law recognized material needs, and
the needs focused on individuals and institutions, not family or friends.
When advocates talked about the relationships people needed, they
referenced a broad and often difficult-to-describe community, not the
particular relationships many people mentioned.
Part V examines homesickness and mobility as embedded in
displacement assistance. I illustrate what is excluded by providing
shelter for a limited time, which assumes the mobile/homesick
dichotomy. Temporary assistance assumes that people miss the place
they left and that missing a place is legally irrelevant. I explore the loss
experienced by people we interviewed, a loss characterized by grief but
neither the optimism of resettling for opportunity nor the expectation of
return. I then argue that a policy based in displacement rather than
security of housing provides little structure for making a new home.
V. MOBILITY, HOMESICKNESS, AND DIASPORA AS AMERICAN FRAMEWORKS
FOR MOVING

A. Mobility as Opportunity
The hope after Hurricane Katrina, the event provoking the most
recent mass displacement in the United States, was that moving
because one was displaced would become moving for a job opportunity.
Moving could allow a story of improvement in life after disaster, a hope
that time did not bear out.7 4 Disaster transforms places, and the new
businesses that rush in in its wake illustrate the creative destruction
that Joseph Schumpeter argued was central to capitalism. 75 As Naomi
Klein has argued more recently, elites use disasters to transform places,
to take these
are
industries. 76 People
and
organizations,
transformations as opportunity, always ready to change their lives and
hurricane. Katrina, in this sense, unveiled certain problems-making them more
unmanageable-rather than created them, as the short-term postdisaster mental health
assistance assumed. Cf. id. at 277-79.
74. See Jacob L. Vigdor, The KatrinaEffect: Was There a Bright Side to the Evacuation
of Greater New Orleans? 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 13022, 2007).
75. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHET OF INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 351-53 (2007) (discussing the idea of creative destruction).
76. NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 8-9 (2007)
(discussing the author's initial foray into the "intersection between superprofits and
megadisasters").

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2

adapt to new circumstances. 77 To expect people to find opportunity in
moving puts the responsibility for adaptation on individuals who move,
rather than on collective policy and the communities to which people
move.
Mobility as opportunity does not work well for older homeowners:
people who are over fifty, have a home, and have lived most of their
lives in one place are least likely to move. Yet people who had family in
the city to which they had fled, even people over fifty, said they did not
plan to return to New Orleans. The prospect of another storm was
frightening, the city would not be rebuilt, and they had family where
they were. Hope that a new place would work out also probably looked
like a more acceptable answer than despair.
People who had not moved from New Orleans before the storm and
were over fifty were not likely candidates for moving and finding
opportunity. Outside of disaster, people who move are different from
those who stay; they are richer, with more years of formal schooling,
and younger. 78 People who move often move for work. People who do not
move stay because they have family ties. 79 Yet when people are
displaced they move because their homes became uninhabitable, which
fits into the categories neither of family nor of work. They may have
wanted to move anyway, and they may have family in the places to
which they move.
In analyses of American mobility outside of disaster, the people who
are most likely to name homesickness are people cities are least likely to
want to keep: older and poorer, less educated, possibly with disabled
family members they need to care for-just the people who were least
likely to return to New Orleans. Older people have a more difficult time
finding work. Many of those from New Orleans received disability
payments. People on disability payments have restrictions on how much
they can work.80 Older people and those with disabilities also will not fit
well into the services that a new city offers for people on public
assistance, such as work-readiness programs. 8 ' They are the people who
77. See Pat O'Malley, Uncertain Governance and Resilient Subjects in the Risk Society,
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ObATi SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 180, 183-90 (2013).
78. See D'VERA COHN & RICH MORIN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICAN MOBILITY: WHO

MOVES? WHO STAYS PUT? WHERE'S HoME? 5 (2008).
79. Id.
80. See JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER,

DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL

SAFETY NET 34 (2006) (discussing the qualification for disability that predicates receipt of
benefits on the inability to perform "substantial gainful activity").
81. See Liz Schott and Ladonna Pavetti, Changes in TANF Work Requirements Could
Make Them More Effective in PromotingEmployment, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/changesin-tanf-work-requirements-could-make-them-more-effective-in.
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most need to be welcomed if they have moved rather than been
temporarily displaced, and who are least likely to have policies to
welcome them in a new place or help to bring them back to an old place.
Ideal workers-and the subjectivities disaster assistance presumes-are
mobile and ready to work, with few encumbrances, whether of family,
limited education, or trauma. Older displaced people who would find it
hard to remake their lives and might have been unlikely to work are
those most likely to feel homesick and least likely to have experience
moving.
B. Homesickness and Homesick by Law
Homesickness is produced by law for people like James, who was
torn about returning for multiple reasons, including that there was no
place to return to, but who must claim to be undecided if he was to
continue to get certified for assistance. Homesickness is also produced
at the analytical and advocacy level, where a measure of how well
governments were performing post-Katrina was determined by how
many people were returning to New Orleans, and how possible it was to
return. Surveys done soon after Hurricane Katrina asked people about
their intentions to return and reasons they would find returning
difficult. Policies that paid housing assistance for those displaced offered
little to help people resettle in a new place. Community organizations
and churches held potlucks and parties, and the refugee resettlement
agencies were to partner people with volunteers who could help. Relief
programs and charitable assistance have been temporary when
communities have been tied to place. Communities offer help to their
own after displacement, or to those nearby, and they expect them to
82
return.
In sum, housing assistance was diverse and changeable, with HUD,
Fannie Mae and FEMA all doing something and local governments
making choices about priorities. As the Congressional Research Service
summed it up in 2008, housing challenges included "the difficulty in
communicating complicated housing policy decisions to a vast and
dispersed population."8 3 The rental assistance required recertification
every three months: people were to be making long-term plans but had
not yet achieved them. What would those plans be? One could get a
house from Fannie Mae for eighteen months for a nominal rent, if a
82. See, e.g., NATL VOLUNTARY ORGS. ACTIVE IN DISASTER, LONG-TERM RECOVERY
MANUAL 1 (2004); see also Thomas A. Krainz, Fleeing the Big Burn: Refugees, Informal
Assistance, and Welfare Practices in the ProgressiveEra, 24 J. POL'Y HIST. 405 (2012).

83. Francis X. McCarthy, FEMA DisasterHousing and HurricaneKatrina: Overview,
Analysis, and CongressionalIssues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2008).
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caseworker found one and a person was willing to move into that house
regardless of whether friends, family, or easy transportation were
nearby.84 Housing advocates explained that people who were victims of
disaster could jump to the top of the local waiting list for federal publichousing vouchers. However, while experiencing displacement after
Katrina was tragic, it is not the only tragedy that has made people
homeless, and it was not the only reason people were homeless across
the United States early in 2006. From a city's point of view, and even
from the point of view of people who need housing assistance because
they had long been homeless, being far from where one had lived and
teetering on homelessness because of a catastrophe should not
necessarily be more urgent than teetering on homelessness because
wages are low, one has substance-abuse problems, or one cannot live
with family anymore. For example, cities and the media were concerned
with policing homeless people who tried to claim benefits as displaced
people. Addressing one kind of reason for housing problems above
others both produces those housing problems as a reason for fleeing, and
requires that one intend to go home.
Thinking through home and return in applications for assistance
invites thinking about the narrative expectations embedded in
assistance. 85 Geographers have been unpacking the multiple meanings
of home and homelessness in law. Most commonly, in law, home has
been conceptualized within the framework of criminal law and
privacy.8 6 To be without a home is to be subject to supervision in public
that makes one without a place to be.87 Expecting that people will
always move for a job opportunity is in tension with an American
longing for home. 88 The longing for home evokes places as "deeply
rooted, fixed places with clear boundaries and stable associated

84. Id.
85. See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic
Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 197 (1995) (discussing the
use of narrative to tell subversive and hegemonic stories that connect lives and
organization in society).
86. See generally DAVID DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF
WORLD-MAKING: NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS (2010).

87. See KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL
IN URBAN AMERICA 37-61 (2010) (detailing the broadly applicable, durable social control
tool of banishment and its transformation of urban social control in Seattle); LEONARD C.
FELDMAN, CITIZENS WITHOUT SHELTER: HOMELESSNESS, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL

EXCLUSION 93-95 (2004).
88. See generally SUSAN J. MATT, HOMESICKNESS: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2011)
(detailing how opportunity has encouraged throughout history people to leave home and,
at the same time, created homesickness and a desire for the familiarity of home).
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identities."8 9 Evoking home as a distinctive place means remembering
what one can do there that is more difficult elsewhere. People told us
about fishing, or playing music in bars on Saturday night and in
churches on Sunday morning, something difficult to replicate in a place
that is not home. Places with clear boundaries and identities do not call
to mind people who are in transit, who have lived elsewhere, or who
have family elsewhere. The loss of home is a greater loss than the loss of
housing. People who are fixed in a place with clear boundaries are out of
place elsewhere. The boundaries of the disaster are boundaries in space
and time and contributed to making New Orleans a distinctive legal
space for which one legally longed 90 because that was a way to claim
assistance when the prospects for housing were otherwise grim for
many. Producing homesickness evokes an image of identities as closely
tied to bounded, identifiable spaces. That image can exclude recognizing
the families and experiences people have outside of the place identified
as home.
Homesickness is the often-untold story of the costs of moving for
opportunity. Naming an emotion also makes it into one thing rather
than another-homesickness over a loss of home rather than anger or
grief, for example-as one tries to articulate need, disruption, and loss.9 1
Home contains multiple meanings, and that multiplicity makes it all the
more powerful: it can be a feeling, and the people one feels at home
with, it can be housing one has lost, and it can be a distinctive place. It
is "a place where one lives and a feeling of comfort-of feeling at
home."92 It can also be a place of loss, isolation, and oppression; home is

not a comfort for all. 93 After Katrina, treating people as displaced from a
home that they had lost emphasized the comfort, not the isolation or
oppression. The policy paying people for being away from home would
tilt the story toward comfort, while the obligation to be mobile would tilt
the story of home to a place that is gone, with infrastructure that
needed to be replicated elsewhere, with any emotional losses bracketed

89. Tim Cresswell, Place, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY
169, 175 (2009), available at http://booksite.elsevier.com/brochures/hugy/SampleContent/
Place.pdf; see also TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE (2004); James S. Duncan & David Lambert,
Landscapes of Home, in A COMPANION TO CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 382 (James S. Duncan et
al. eds., 2004). On the specific case of postdisaster New Orleans, see generally Margaret E.
Farrar, Home/Sick"Memory, Place, and Loss in New Orleans, 12 THEORY & EVENT (2009).
90. See generally Sarah Blandy & David Sibley, Law, Boundaries and the Productionof
Space, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 275 (2010) (discussing the meaning of boundaries in social,
legal, cultural, economic, physical, and political settings).
91. See Duncan & Lambert, supra note 89; Deborah B. Gould, Life During Wartime:
Emotions and the Development of Act Up, 7 MOBILIZATION: AN INT'L J. 177, 180-89 (2002).
92. Duncan & Lambert, supra note 89, at 382.
93. See CRESSWELL, supra note 89, at 25.
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off. Narrating home narrates an origin story that includes place, family,
and friends who are together for a reason, not because chance threw
them together. Homesickness is a wish for a stable and known place,
particularly acute after sharp breaks. What has long been the mobility
of many Americans over time has made it a characteristically American
emotion.
Where there are sharp breaks in lives, law promises to stabilize
identities by "backing them with papers," making a narrative of
belonging in a place that originates with policies rather than in nature,
however much the policy might claim nature predates it. 94 Policies can
keep people between places, or not ever at home. 95 No legal ritual or
paper certification brings people into new identities after sharp breaks.
Indeed, after Katrina, the people who had fled had to be recognized as
equal citizens across the country, at the same time that the United
States heard repeated commentary about the distinctive character of
New Orleans and the people within it, whether the people and the place
were read as sinful or charmed. 96
Yet law fed on homesickness. Treating longing for home as both a
legal qualification for assistance and an emotion raises troubling
questions about equality of citizenship. In diasporas people live
transnationally; if housing assistance after disaster is offered because
people are out of place, they belong in one place rather than another.
Paying for assistance when people have lost a home because of disaster
continues the patchwork effort in public policy to limit assistance to the
truly deserving, an effort that invites fraud by picking out one reason
rather than another as making someone legitimately needy. Equal
citizenship answered the argument that people from New Orleans had
distinctive problems and history. However, if the people and the place
distinguished themselves because of deep roots and a rich culture rather
than pathology, displacement could entail homesickness rather than
disparagement. After Katrina, the force of homesickness became a mode
of analysis to critique the long-term response of the multiple levels of
government. People who had fled were a diaspora. 97 Those with severe
storm damage to their homes have been less likely to move back, and

94. See, e.g., EWICK & SIBLEY, supra note 44, at 165-220; Yngvesson & Coutin, supra
note 44.
95. See, e.g., Coutin, supra note 24.
96. Henry Jenkins, "Peoplefrom that Part of the World" The Politics of Dislocation, 21
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 469, 469-73 (2006) (discussing the reference to New Orleans
residents as people from "that part of the world").
97. See generally DISPLACED: LIFE IN THE KATRINA DIASPORA (Lynn Weber & Lori Peek
eds., 2012).

DOCUMENTATION AND EMOTIONS

593

98
those with family in New Orleans are more likely to move back.
Evaluating who returns takes return to New Orleans as a measure of
the well-being of people who were displaced. Diaspora has implied
shared national origins of people who are away from their homeland
99
and have crossed national borders. In contrast, the policy conclusion
that people must move from the coasts does not take people to be tied to
a place. If people comprise a diaspora, the policy solution is to bring
people home. If people are to be mobile individuals, ready to work, then
they will settle in their new place. An alternative is grieving for the
impossibility of return, taking into account the strengths people can
bring, and recognizing a need for policies that help people resettle.
Neither the positive nor negative meaning of New Orleans as a
distinctive place, nor the responsibility of individuals to move for
opportunity, imagines politics of inclusion in new communities. The
rental payments that FEMA made kept people in temporary housing,
for some until March 2009, and the payments themselves helped to
10 0
make one a displaced person rather than someone who resettled.
Without systematic policies of inclusion, family allowed people to stay
where they had fled. Those who had every reason to find it hardest to
move-because they were older, or because they had lived a long time in
New Orleans-found themselves caught between the two poles of
American mobility. Mobility had to be an opportunity or one had to long
to go home. That split did not accommodate grief. People could miss
what was gone and never expect it back. The housing assistance not
only kept. people in-between by being temporary yet extended by
months. It provided shelter, and the need for shelter dominated all
other needs, however much mental health professionals and trained
laypeople tried to provide help.
The production of subjects as either longing for return or willingly
mobile are two poles that may capture dominant American
understandings of moving, but they do not capture all that people
displaced after disaster feel. Displaced people themselves articulated
hope for resettling in a new place, made more plausible by the presence
of family, friends, and previous experience with their new city. They
expected to stay where they had fled and, at the same time, found
themselves longing for a home that was not there. The hope for
resettlement not only tracked the American story of mobility and
individual resilience; displaced people also critiqued what New Orleans
had been in their own neighborhoods. Their governments left the most

98. Elizabeth Fussell et al., Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Return Migration to New
Orleans After HurricaneKatrina, 31 POPULATION & ENV'T 20, 23-25 (2010).
99. ROBIN COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (2008).
100. See McCarthy, supranote 83.
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vulnerable on rooftops during a flood. Long-term neglect long before the
flood made neighborhoods difficult for some to miss, and still home for
others. No public policy provided a framework for reconciling these
emotionally complex narratives, whether by improving the places people
were or by making inclusion a local priority.
The production of subjects as belonging in places from which they
are displaced will continue to be important given the expectation of
increasing numbers of extreme weather events and sea-level rise. The
National Climate Assessment for 2013 argues that the current strategy
has been one of "(un)managed retreat,"10 1 which implies continuing to
have to treat the need for housing as a way to manage complex
employment and housing problems after disaster, and informing people
of the material reasons they should not go home, but, to keep receiving
assistance, they should not resettle.
Distinguishing need after disaster from the broader policies of
homelessness was evident in payment of assistance and in naming
people who had fled the Gulf Coast a "diaspora." A diaspora identifies
with a homeland, and that homeland creates ties across space. Those
ties may not have been so evident before the event. What that pairing
excludes is grief at what was lost, support for resettling, and support for
recognizing home and need as something other than shelter, and the
housing assistance as intertwined with the emotional needs. The policy
of placing shelter above all else replicates a focus in U.S. law on the
10 2
material benefits of rights.
C. What Diaspora,Shelter, and Mobility Miss: Loss and the Need to
Resettle
Although some people missed home desperately, they were also
cautious about whether they could ever return. In the first interview,
only two said they wanted to return, though almost all wished they
could. They knew the city was devastated, and that their hometown
would not be rebuilt in the same way. The storm had been traumatic,
and moving back to where one had seen trees snapped, dead bodies, and
alligators swimming by would only bring that trauma back. Few trusted
that the levees would hold in another storm. Poor people, including
those who had long held family homes, faced a disproportionate risk of
harm from hurricanes, given where people were in the city and the
engineering of levees and canals. 10 3 For those who had lost family in
101. Moser et al., supranote 6, at 591.
102. See GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 48, at 58-59.
103. See WILLIAM R. FREUDENBERG ET AL., CATASTROPHE IN THE MAKING: THE
ENGINEERING OF KATRINA AND THE DISASTERS OF TOMORROW 19 (2009).
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other storms, the history of Katrina stretched back into past losses,
compounding reasons not to stay. Neither staying away nor moving to
New Orleans could make a home when New Orleans would never be
what it had been.
Asking people if they planned to move back or wanted to return
brought a new identity for people who had lived their entire lives in
New Orleans. Still, those who lived in family homes and had not left
New Orleans before had not thought of themselves as people who chose
where to live. They lived where they had a home. As a sixty-two-yearold African American woman said in reflecting on why she could not
return to where she had lived for so long:
I'm not goin' back to New Orleans. I will never go back.
It will never be the same any more. I've lost-through
the two hurricanes, I've lost half a generation. Twentytwo people, from 1932, I think it was, added all together,
twenty-two relatives. I wouldn't want to go back there.
It's a lot of heartache.
Her memory of loss stretched across generations. When she
explained that she had lost relatives in about 1932, she might have been
referring either to the Great Mississippi flood in 1927, when many died
and many more were displaced, 10 4 or a lesser yet still devastating flood
in 1937. She missed something, or she would not have mentioned that it
would never be the same any more. Still, she remembered all the
relatives who had died, something no rebuilding could fix. Why, with
family who could help in a new state, would she want to return? She
still recognized that moving to Colorado did not allow a fresh start, or
new opportunities for her. It would, she believed, for younger people.
Any choice of where to live evoked loss, whether Denver or New
Orleans. In Denver she had housing assistance. If the only place she
could rebuild was New Orleans once temporary housing assistance
stopped, perhaps she would move there, but that too would be a loss.
Most people described missing home, and home was where family
and one's house were. However, some had connections to Denver when
they moved there; they had lived there before, or had family and friends
in town. Eight of the thirteen people had family in Colorado, including
some with children in school. Children had a hard time settling; if they
105
got grounded in school there would be even more reason to stay.
104. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1997).
105. See LORI PEEK & ALICE FOTHERGILL, RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: AN
EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CHILDREN IN HURRICANE KATRINA 9-10 (2006); Jennifer A. Reich
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For many, it was hard to imagine rebuilding a life without enough
money, without friends, and without a home. The evacuation was
traumatic, and the state of Colorado treated people better than New
Orleans after the storm. (Good treatment in Colorado was ascribed to
the character of the people, generous beyond their means, rather than to
the federal money that allowed relief or to the comparatively small
number of evacuees taken in by Colorado.) If family in New Orleans
pulled one back, family members who got settled in a new place or were
afraid to return could help a person resolve to stay away. As a forty-twoyear-old African American woman who had evacuated with family
explained,
My family has decided not to go back. They're afraid of
the levees. The city doesn't know what they're gonna do.
They're movin' on, even though they don't want to. They
can't endure this much longer. My grandmother's not
going back. She's eighty-three years old. She says, "I
can't evacuate again."
She had come to the city she was in because she had lived there
before, and she would stay away from New Orleans because her family
was afraid and her grandmother too old to move. Even so, six months
later she reflected how hard it was to resettle and what she missed
about New Orleans:
Mainly, just the connection I have with my family and
my childhood neighborhood. And you know the
familiarity of my city. I still feel like I don't know ...
[this city] has changed so much since I lived here, and I
get frustrated not knowing where I'm going.
What she longed for had disappeared, so returning was not
something she considered. It was still hard to resettle. In a later
interview, she reflected about her daughter's wish to return:
She said that she didn't want to go back in the state that
it's in now, because it's not...she doesn't know if she can
deal with looking at that every day. So on one hand she's
homesick, and the other hand it's like she already knows
& Martha Wadsworth, Out of the Floodwaters, but Not Yet on Dry Ground: Experiences of
Displacement and Adjustment in Adolescents and Their Parents Following Hurricane
Katrina, 18 CHILD., YOUTH & ENV'TS 354, 363-65 (2008).
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what it's going to be like. She hasn't seen it, and I don't
think she would enjoy being there... not being able to do
things like a normal person.
Staying in place was hard, even having known the new city before.
Return was impossible. Wanting to return could mean wanting to
return to a place that no longer existed.
For many, the loss was much more devastating than only longing for
home. Home was not there anymore. Expecting people to rebuild their
lives without familiar surroundings, friends, or family asks too much of
people whose children are grown and who did not move for opportunity.
Even those few who found work and expected to stay could find the loss
overwhelming. As a fifty-four-year-old African American man explained
to us,
Right now I would say I'm financially able to rebuild
again, but it's not the money thing, it's the, I just miss
what I had, I just miss everything around, money can't
buy everything. Because every time I go somewhere, go
places, I look around the city and I realize it's not New
Orleans. I realize that I'm far away from home, you
know, even when I'm walking, I'm looking around saying
boy, boy, boy, where am I. It's a challenge trying to
convert your life from what it was to trying to start a
new one. 'Cause if you're starting a new one, you don't
have the same support group. You don't have the same
friends, your family's not close, the environment is
different, you know, you got to get used to new food, all
this other stuff like I told you all about.
He concluded by turning the problem back on us:
[S]ay you ladies go home this evening or go back to [your
city and university] or something and you find the whole
town wiped out. You know, you find, you know houses
destroyed. Your friends' houses gone. Your family, where
they at? You know just think of all that.
He was settled and could not imagine moving back. He had seen
devastation and did not believe his home or his friends would ever come
back. The disaster assistance made it possible to live in a new place.
However, he needed something other than money. Friends, family, and
familiar surroundings made a home. The law could not produce home, of
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course, and perhaps no one expects that it can. When assistance
requires stating what one plans to do and making a choice, though, it
can contribute to producing an expectation that one can choose to be at
home when need far exceeds what the housing assistance can assuage.
CONCLUSION: MISSING Loss IN THE CLAIM TO HOME

One response to displacement is to draw people together at home,
and nonprofit groups tried to do that by inviting people to report where
they were so others could find them and they could be brought back
home. 10 6 Years after the storm, nonprofits rebuilt houses in New
Orleans, particularly for homeowners who had not had insurance. 107 A
grant program provided assistance to homeowners as late as 2013.
Without infrastructure, however, people have not returned even to
houses built by charities. 10 8
Alternatively, the response can be to draw people together and work
toward integration where they are. To state the task for displacement as
welcoming newcomers instead assumes that people move and do not
still aim to move back. The United States does not have policies to help
people resettle together, or to help communities assist new, traumatized
residents. People are themselves responsible for knowing where they
have friends and family, and evacuation advice includes telling people to
have plans to contact friends and family. Evacuation plans do not
include getting people to where they want to go, nor did the plans postKatrina include working with where people had friends or family to call
on. The extensive (and variable) disaster assistance that goes to
individuals is not organized to bring people together. Federal money
paid state and county governments to offer mental health assistance in
cities with evacuees immediately after Katrina, and the organizations
put together support groups. However, there are no guidelines for
welcoming people when by law they were out of place rather than
resettled. Under the forms they filed and according to the international
guidelines that no one on the ground referenced, people were to choose
where to live, but the resources required to choose were outside what
law could provide. The lack of housing for low-income renters in both
106. Chris Kromm and Sue Sturgis, HurricaneKatrina and the Guiding Principleson

Internal Displacement: A Global Human Rights Perspective on a National Disaster,
INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES 26 (January 2008).
107. See generally MAKE IT RIGHT, http:www.makeitright.org; LOWER 9TH WARD
HOMEOWNERSHIP ASSOCIATION, http://www.lower9thwardhomeowners.org.
108. See Lydia DePillis, If You Rebuild It, They Might Not Come, NEW REPUBLIC (March
13, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/112620/brad-pitts-make-it-right-houses-drag.
new-orleans.
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New Orleans and the places to which people fled made choosing for
those who had the greatest need very difficult. Voluntary associations
can help people to resettle as a community, relying on the skills they
have and what they know. Voluntary-agency liaisons and FEMA
employees helped to convene community groups. Churches held parties
and community meetings to inform people about how to apply for
assistance. 109 However, it was hard to gather people together where
people had no transportation or obvious place to meet, and there was no
simple way to gather names and get the word out. Despite tremendous
good will, it can be hard to bring people together when there is no
previous plan for how to do it or an easy place to gather.
After all, displacement can be one more part of the United States'
history of mobility. Americans moved out onto the plains, displacing
Native Americans. The Trail of Tears forced the Cherokee out of their
homes in Georgia to Oklahoma. Southern African Americans fled for the
North in the Great Migration after the First World War and into the
Second, fleeing lynching, cruel mismanagement of disaster after the
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, and segregation, responding to job
opportunities in the North. Americans fled the devastation of the Dust
Bowl in the 1930s, leaving Oklahoma, Texas, and parts of Colorado to
try to make a life elsewhere.
In public rhetoric, we still treat disaster as a legitimate reason, for a
little while, to be poor, out of place, and needing help. Disasters draw
our attention, horror, and sympathy both for those who get paid or who
get compensation for helping, and for those who suffered through the
disaster. 110 However, when the disaster upends fragile stability, as it
did for James, people need assistance for much longer than the news
cycle. As attention fades, people have the same assistance available that
is available to everyone else. The same set of explanations for why
people are poor or how assistance works that applies to everyone who
have not suffered in a disaster will apply to those who did.
Few policies are in place to welcome newcomers in the United
States. That would require planning; once people have fled,
communities of displaced people can be difficult to find and difficult to
bring together. After Katrina, people could choose where to live, and

109. C.f. Susan M. Sterett & Jennifer A. Reich, Prayerand Social Welfare in the Wake of
Katrina: Race and Volunteerism in Disaster Response, in RACING THE STORM: RACIAL
IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 135 (Hillary Potter ed.,
2007).

110. See STERETT, supra note 1. See generally DAUBER, supra note 1; KEVIN ROZARIO,
THE CULTURE OF CALAMITY: DISASTER AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2007);
THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING
EVENTS (1997).
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they received rent payments."i
The dispersal that direct housing
payments to landlords allows, and that allows people to move where
they can find housing, militates against building community among
those displaced.
If those who fled Hurricane Katrina comprise a diaspora,
homesickness fixes Katrina in a place, in New Orleans, rather than in
the people who spread across the country. Law helps organize the
emotion and the narrative one would name after displacement,
particularly given the law that placed people in between.112 After
Katrina and after other storms, the federal government has paid for
housing for people who were displaced from their home. Clients had to
be away from home to gain first emergency assistance and then
individual assistance: anyone who had moved to a new place, in the
sense of being permanently settled, was not entitled to assistance.
Anyone who returned home lost rental assistance. FEMA does not pay
for people to move, nor does it pay for people to be at home. It pays for
displacement. The stories people had to tell to continue to get assistance
were stories of being away from home temporarily, and planning either
to return or to find long-term housing where they were. When the
program ended for the last of those assisted after Katrina and Rita in
March 2009, most were no longer gaining rental assistance, but the
poorest may not have left because they had resettled. They had run out
of benefits, or did not satisfy documentation requirements. The
assistance was confusing to track; as caseworkers and volunteers
explained to people how they could qualify for individual assistance,
they needed to be making long-term plans while living in short-term
plans that could not transfer well to the long term. 11 3 Legal recognition
required fixing New Orleans as a previous home they had not .intended
to leave when the storm hit.114
The marginal assistance available to return people to the mobile
subjects they are supposed to be may fit well with a late welfare state
that requires market solutions, individual investment in one's human
capital, and nonprofit voluntarism to assist people for a short time. It
111. See Sheila Crowley, Where is Home? Housingfor Low-Income People After the 2005
Hurricanes, in THERE is NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND
HURRICANE KATRINA 121 (Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006); see also
Susan M. Sterett, New Orleans Everywhere: Bureaucratic Accountability and Housing
Policy After Katrina, in CATASTROPHE: LAW, POLITICS AND THE HUMANITARIAN IMPULSE
83, supranote 23 (describing housing assistance for displaced persons after Katrina).
112. See Pasquetti, supra note 52.
113. See Sterett, supra note 13.
114. For a discussion on law as fixing a reality it claims only to recognize, see generally
Barbara Yngvesson & Susan Coutin, Schrodinger's Cat and the Ethnography of Law, 31
POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOL. REV. 61 (2008).
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can only make sense in the context of the broader policies of
homelessness. Nonprofits experienced in disaster relief, as well as
public agencies that provide assistance, hold that people are to be
returned to the state they were in before the disaster. If they were
homeless before the disaster, they are to be homeless after it. If the
available resources did not work for people before the disaster, they
probably will not afterwards. Requiring that, to deserve help, people
have to come from a distinctive place in which they had been rooted,
and to which they would like to return, invites fraudulent claims from
people who need help for other reasons. Those homeless for other
reasons and living alongside displaced people have no reason to
understand why they are excluded from help when they need it, might
have also moved for multiple reasons, and suffered something other
than storms. Displacement picks out belonging to a place as a
distinctive reason people need public assistance, which cannot
acknowledge the helpful family and friends who live elsewhere, and one
that is puzzling to all the others who also need help for other reasons.
Communities, not just coastal communities and not just individuals,
need practices that incorporate traumatized newcomers.

